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Abstract Advances in neuroscience are underpinned by
large, multicenter studies and a mass of heterogeneous
datasets. When investigating the relationships between brain
anatomy and brain functions under normal and pathological
conditions, measurements obtained from a broad range of
brain imaging techniques are correlated with the information
on each subject’s neurologic states, cognitive assessments and
behavioral scores derived from questionnaires and tests. The
development of ontologies in neuroscience appears to be a
valuable way of gathering and handling properly these het-
erogeneous data – particularly through the use of federated
architectures. We recently proposed a multilayer ontology for
sharing brain images and regions of interest in neuroimaging.
Here, we report on an extension of this ontology to the
representation of instruments used to assess brain and cogni-
tive functions and behavior in humans. This extension con-
sists of a ‘core’ ontology that accounts for the properties
shared by all instruments supplemented by ‘domain’ ontol-
ogies that conceptualize standard instruments.We also specify
how this core ontology has been refined to build domain
ontologies dedicated to widely used instruments and how
various scores used in the neurosciences are represented.
Lastly, we discuss our design choices, the ontology’s limita-
tions and planned extensions aimed at querying and reasoning
across distributed data sources.
Keywords Biomedical ontology . Scale .
Neuropsychological dataset . Federated architecture .
Mediation . Data integration . Neuroscience
Introduction
In neurosciences, imaging plays a central role providing in-
formation about brain structure and function. In particular,
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) generates anatomical
and functional information on the healthy or diseased brain
and is a cornerstone of cognitive neuroscience (Logothetis
2008; Raichle 2009).
The Need for Ontologies of Instruments To further investigate
the complexity of the human brain, recent studies of large
population cohorts have sought to cross-relate MRI markers
with biomarker levels, cognitive parameters and behavioral
scores. The studies’main objectives are to (i) relate aspects of
brain morphology to human behavior and cognitive perfor-
mance levels and (ii) investigate the underlying neural mech-
anisms. The NeuroLOG project1 was launched with the ob-
jective of facilitating the sharing of neuroimaging data and
image-processing resources via an ontology-based, federated
approach (Gibaud et al. 2011). OntoNeuroLOG was devel-
oped during the four-year NeuroLOG project (2007–2010)
and was used to link four French imaging repositories: Paris
1 The NeuroLOG project (2007–2010) was funded by the French Na-
tional Agency for Research. http://neurolog.i3s.unice.fr/neurolog/
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Pitié-Salpêtrière, Grenoble Institute for Neurosciences, INRIA
Sophia-Antipolis and VISAGES. This ontology was designed
with the concrete goal of sharing instrument-based assessment
results in the context of the NeuroLOG project and
NeuroLOG platform. However, the overall ontology and the
core ontology of instruments were designed to help model a
much wider range of instruments than is required in the
NeuroLOG project. The project shares a number of features
with the Biomedical Informatics Research Network2 initia-
tive, which pioneered work on federated data integration and
provided proof of concept of the application of ontology-
based mediation to neurosciences research (Martone et al.
2004). Computer scientists, biologists (Hill et al. 2010) and
neuroscientists (Van Horn and Toga 2009) now broadly agree
that ontology development is an essential issue when captur-
ing, storing, representing and then sharing knowledge about a
specific biomedical domain. In particular, the NeuroLOG
project proposed a multilayer application ontology
(OntoNeuroLOG) for the specification of common semantics
when sharing brain images (Temal et al. 2008). In the work
presented here, we provided OntoNeuroLOG with an ontolo-
gy of instruments used to assess brain and cognitive (dys)
functions, behaviors and psychological states in humans.
How Our Work Is Positioned There are several international
efforts addressing the representation of “cognitive neurosci-
ences” information. For our purposes, to model instruments
we need to combine abstract and concrete terms. Indeed, if we
consider the NCBO BioPortal (today’s largest resource for
biomedical ontologies) several ontologies were relevant: from
the 369 published ontologies, 104 concern methods and tools
for evaluating brain functions (retrieved using six keywords:
Assessment, Instrument, Score, Scale, Test and Question-
naire) and 148 refer to brain functions (retrieved using 19
keywords: generic keywords such as Cognition, Emotion or
Sensation; domain keywords such as Working Memory, Epi-
sodic Memory or Executive function; or quality and measure
keywords such as Intelligence quotient, Verbal fluency or
Perseveration, and instrument or test keywords such as Rey
Figure, STROOP or CDR scale).
We analyzed the nine most relevant ontologies (RCD,
NCIT, SNOMED, NIFSTD, BIRNLex, COGAT, LOINC,
SYN and ERO), in order to determine how pivotal concepts
such as ‘Instrument’ and ‘Assessment’ were modeled. We
concluded that these ontologies do not describe the internal
structure of instruments because the latter are considered as
physical objects (generally linked to a ‘Device’ (BFO) or a
‘Medical Device’ (UMLS)). The NIFSTD ontology (Version
2.9.6.1 of September 3, 2013) adopts the most interesting
approach, in which a classification of “Assessments”
(inherited from BIRNLex) is provided as a subclass of
“Protocol application” which in turn is a subclass of “Planned
process” (and is thus related to the realization of a “Plan”).
However the part addressing assessment instruments is neither
complete nor fully consistent. Instruments are assessments
without explicit models. Moreover, the notion of sub-
instrument is not present and then no explicit relation exists
between the global score provided and the underlying sub-
instruments scores that compose it. Variables measured by an
instrument are not introduced and finally there is no explicit
distinction between the tool for investigation (i.e. instrument),
the investigation process (i.e. instrument assessment) and the
score obtained. These models represent neither the internal
structure of instruments nor the resulting scores, assessment
actions and variables used to refer to the qualities measured.
We strongly consider that models with these characteristics are
required and should be managed consistently across the broad
range of existing instruments. Our aim with our instrument
ontology was to formally represent all these concepts.
Our Ontological Approach Our prime objective is to facilitate
the sharing of cognitive and behavioral scores in the federated
systems that underpin multicenter research studies and clinical
trials in the neurosciences. As with the ADNI and HCP
initiatives, the intention is to correlate cognitive and behav-
ioral scores with imaging markers and biomarkers.
Many different “assessment instruments” are used in the
neurosciences. This diversity is driven by the need to capture
the many facets of human brain function and behavior and the
very broad spectrum of symptoms associated with brain dys-
function. It also results from clinicians’ and psychologists’ on-
going efforts to improve existing instruments and introduce
new ones, in order to assess brain functions in ever greater
detail (White and Hauan 2002).
To build our ontology of instruments, we adopted a multi-
layer, multicomponent approach that had already been imple-
mented within the NeuroLOG project (Temal et al. 2006). In
fact, OntoNeuroLOG is organized into sub-ontologies
(modules) situated at three different levels of abstraction. At
the most abstract level, the DOLCE foundational ontology
(Masolo et al. 2003) provides a set of abstract concepts (e.g.
physical object and quality) and relations (e.g. part-whole,
constitution, etc.) for structuring any kind of domain by spe-
cialization. DOLCE is supplemented here by a few formal
ontologies, such as a formal ontology of artifacts (Kassel
2010). At an intermediate level, “core” domain ontologies
(Gangemi and Borgo 2004) define a minimal set of generic
and key concepts (e.g. subject, domain and score) for each
domain concerned. Lastly, at the most specific level, core
domain ontologies are in their turn refined via the introduction
of specialized, domain-specific concepts (e.g. stroke, evoked
potential and thrombolysis in neurology). This multilevel
abstraction approach consists in applying the same set of
generic principles to the conceptualization of domains2 http://www.birncommunity.org/
Neuroinform
covered by application ontologies. The main objective here is
to facilitate the development and maintenance of ontologies
and to ensure a high degree of cross-domain consistency
(Smith and Scheuermann 2011).
The ontology presented here includes modules situated
both at the intermediate level of core domain ontologies and
at the most specific level of domain ontologies. Our core
domain ontology (presented in part at the Formal Ontology
in Information Systems conference (Batrancourt et al. 2010))
seeks to capture the essential neuropsychological and psycho-
metric properties of a number of instruments, including: (i)
their decomposition into sub-instruments, (ii) the definition of
associated variables (leading to scores) and (iii) the current
domains and qualities explored and measured by these instru-
ments and variables. The core domain ontology was supple-
mented with domain ontologies, each of which conceptualizes
specific kinds of instrument (e.g. the Wechsler Adult Intelli-
gence Scale (WAIS) and the Expanded Disability Status Scale
(EDSS)). In this case, an instance represents an instrument
administered at a particular center (e.g. EDSS – Pitié-
Salpêtrière Hospital (Paris, France)).
The ontology is available at the BioPortal repository
(https://bioportal.bioontology.org/ontologies/ONL-MSA). Its
implementation (specification and use) as a component of a
specific federated architecture for facilitating data sharing in
distributed data centers has been described in (Michel et al.
2010) and (Gibaud et al. 2011). In this paper we focus on the
contents of the ontology.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, we describe the generic modules of
OntoNeuroLOG that were reused for our present work.
In Section 3, we describe our core ontology of the
domain of instruments; it covers instruments, actions
corresponding to the administration of instruments and
the scores obtained as a result. In Section 4, we present
specializations of the core ontology (domain ontologies)
modeling three specific instruments that are widely used
in clinical practice3: the Mini-Mental State (MMS) or
Mini-Mental Status Examination (MMSE), the Expanded
Disability Status Scale (EDSS) and the Clinical Dementia
Rating (CDR). Lastly, we discuss our design choices, the
current limitations of our conceptualization and planned
extensions in Section 5.
Our Ontological Reference Framework
Here, we provide a brief reminder of the main structuring
principles and concepts that underlie important modules
reused in the present work. An excerpt of our foundational
concepts’ taxonomy is shown in Fig. 1.
Particulars (DOLCE)
The DOLCE ontology (C. Masolo et al. 2003) constitutes the
keystone of OntoNeuroLOG. DOLCE’s domain is that of
Particulars,4 that is to say entities that cannot be instantiated
(e.g. “my car”) rather than universals (e.g. “being a car”).
Four sub-domains of Particulars are distinguished (see
Fig. 1):
& Endurants5 are entities “enduring in time”, which are
primarily directly related to space. Physical objects (e.g.
a pen, a printed copy of an article) are typical Endurants.
Besides Physical objects, DOLCE considers a class of
Non-physical Objects. The distinction between Physical
Objects and Non-physical Objects corresponds to the
difference between two realities or modes of existence.
Basically, Non-Physical Objects exist insofar as agents
conventionally create them and speak about them. The
domain of Non-Physical Objects covers entities whose
existence depends on either an individual (Mental Objects,
e.g. a private mnemonic method, or the content of this
sentence that you interpret) or a community of agents
(Social Objects, e.g. a company, the stipulations of a law).
& Perdurants are entities “occurring in time”, which are
primarily directly related to time. Perdurants are generated
by Endurants: the latter temporarily participate in
(participatesInDuring) the former.
& Endurants and Perdurants have Qualities that we perceive
and/or measure (e.g. the weight of a printed copy of this
article and the time spent reading this article). Note that
Qualities are inherent to the entity that bears them, since
they are characteristic of their bearer and present through-
out its existence.
& Qualities temporarily occupy positions within Regions.
Some Regions called Qualia (Quale in the singular) are
defined as atomic Regions (e.g. “25 g in weight” and
“20 min in duration”). Other Regions are mereological
sums (sums of parts) of Qualia. For instance, the Region of
colors named ‘red’ may be considered as having for parts
the Qualia named “Scarlet” and “Crimson”. The sum of all
Qualia associated with a Quality kind is called a (Quality)
3 According to Pubmed, MMS, EDSS and CDR were respectively cited
in 3043, 872 and 1070 publications over the period 2008–2012.
4 With respect to our notation, the informal labels onDOLCE’s categories
appear in the text in Courier New font with First Capital
Letters for the concepts and a javaLikeNotation for relations.
The same conventions apply to all the ontologies presented in the present
paper.
5 Due to space limitations, we only provide brief descriptions of
DOLCE’s categories and those used in our ontology of instruments. For
a complete presentation, the reader is invited to refer to (Trypuz 2008).
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Space. Spaces in DOLCE are similar to Gärdenfors’ con-
ceptual spaces (Gärdenfors, 2000).
As is commonly the case, the development of ontol-
ogies in a particular domain requires the prior extension
of the foundational resources. For example, in order to
conceptualize the assessment of a subject’s ability to
walk a certain distance, we need to have the generic
notions of ability and action at our disposal (and these
are not present in DOLCE). Similarly, to model the act
of taking a patient’s temperature with a thermometer, we
need the generic notions of instrument and measurement
instrument. In the remainder of this section, we complete
DOLCE with some generic modules needed to concep-
tualize our application domain.
Inscriptions, Expressions, and Conceptualizations
In the present work, we consider intangible (i.e. non-physical)
instruments as contents of documents specifying rules for
measuring the subject’s state, behavior or brain function.
These instruments contrast with physical instruments (e.g.
thermometers and computed tomography (CT) scanners). To
model these conceptual contents, we reused the Inscription &
Expression & Conceptualization (IEC) module (Fortier and
Kassel 2004), which provides a set of basic contents for
handling the generic notion of document. The IEC module is
a core ontology in the domain of information and information-
bearing entities. It extends DOLCE by introducing three main
kinds of entities:
& Inscriptions (e.g. printed texts and computer files) are
physical knowledge forms materialized by a sub-
stance (e.g. ink or an electrical field) and inscribed
on a physical support (e.g. a sheet of paper or a hard
disk). In addition to their materiality, one important
characteristic of Inscriptions lies in their “intentional”
nature (meaning that these entities count as other
entities). For example, Inscriptions count as
Expressions.
& Expressions (e.g. texts and logical formulae) are non-
physical knowledge forms ordered by a communication
language. Expressions are physicallyRealizedBy Inscrip-
tions and, like Inscriptions, they are intentional entities
conveying contents for agents.
& Conceptualizations consist of the ultimate means by
which agents can reason about a world. Two kinds of
Conceptualizations are distinguished: Propositions, as a
means of describing states of affairs, and Concepts, as a
means of classifying entities. Note that, as for the practical
Fig. 1 An excerpt of our taxonomy of concepts at the foundational level. A dashed rectangle delimits a specific ontological module; a solid arrow
represents a subsumption link (i.e. an “is a” relation); a dashed line indicates that sibling concepts are incompatible (i.e. they have disjoint extensions)
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semiotics6 introduced in the SUMO ontology (Pease and
Niles 2002), Propositions may encompass the content
expressed by sentences, theories, books and even libraries.
We shall see in Section 3 that Propositions correspond to
the intrinsic nature of our assessment instruments. Meanwhile,
we extend DOLCE in another way, in order to account for
actions.
Actions and Participation Roles
The instruments are administered in order to evaluate the
subjects’ state, behavior or brain function. The administration
of these instruments and the assessment of the subjects’ state
are actions - in other words, events intentionally carried out by
agents. The design of an instrument is itself an action. To
account for this notion of action, we use a minimum set of
concepts (see Fig. 1):
& Actions are Perdurants controlled by an intention. They
contrast with Happenings, which lack an intentional
cause.
& Deliberate Actions are premeditated actions. According to
current philosophical theories of actions, Deliberate Ac-
tions are controlled by a prior intention that consists in
planning the action (before its initiation) and then in
controlling it in a rational way (Pacherie 2000).
& According to another classification dimension, Physical
Actions (whose effects bear on Physical Endurants, e.g.
curing a patient) are distinct from Conceptual Actions
(whose effects bear on Conceptualizations, e.g. acquiring
data from subjects).
Various entities participate in these Actions in different
ways, in the sense that they have different roles. As a com-
plement to DOLCE, our “Participation role” module special-
izes the participation relation participatesInDuring to account
for specific ways in which Endurants participate temporally in
Actions (e.g. isAgentOfAt, isInstrumentOfAt, isResultOfAt).
In turn, these relations are used to define participation roles
specializing the concept Endurant (e.g. Agent, Instrument or
Result). However, participation roles do not define the essence
of the entities playing these roles. For example, an entity
playing the role of an Agent needs to possess a disposition
(or capacity) to intentionally control events. This type of
disposition may be owned by various entities: a human being,
an organization, a robot or a sophisticated sensor. Entities
playing the role of an Instrument are generally technical
artifacts that have been intentionally produced for that very
purpose. These artifacts may be physical sensors or concep-
tual measurement procedures. In the next section, we intro-
duce a set of concepts to reflect the essence of the artifacts.
Artifacts
Artifacts are commonly defined as “entities intentionally
made or produced for some reason” (Hilpinen 2004). To be
able to describe the two main dimensions characterizing these
entities (namely being intentionally produced and being pro-
duced for a certain reason), we reuse concepts from our
ontological module “Function &Artifact” (Kassel 2010). Ac-
cording to this ontology:
& Artifacts are the result of an intentional production and
thus have an Author.
& Artifacts are produced for a certain reason. Various kinds
of reasons (and hence various types of Artifacts) are
considered: to convey an emotion and be of aesthetic
interest (for works of art) or enable their author (or another
agent) to do something (for “functional” or Technical
Artifacts). The latter are Artifacts to which a Function is
ascribed, given that a Function is defined as an “acknowl-
edged capacity to enable the realization of a kind of
action” (Kassel 2010).
& Within Technical Artifacts, Private Artifacts are distin-
guished from Social Artifacts according to whether the
function in question is ascribed by an individual or a
community of agents.
It is important to note that DOLCE’s distinction between
Physical and Non-Physical Objects transcends the domain of
Artifacts. Indeed, the latter are defined by the origin of their
existence (i.e. their intentional production) rather than a mode
of existence (i.e. their dependence vis-à-vis agents who con-
ventionally create, make use of and communicate about them
(C. Masolo et al. 2004)). This difference explains why we are
able to distinguish between physical artifacts (e.g. a CT scan-
ner) and non-physical artifacts (e.g. assessment rules
expressed in a document). To account for this distinction, we
consider that Technical Artifacts (i) possess an internal (phys-
ical, social or cognitive) essence, (ii) have been intentionally
produced and (iii) necessarily have a Function.
A Core Ontology of Assessment Instruments
As emphasized above, a wide range of assessment instruments
exists. Some are very simple, with just a few indicators
6 The term “semiotics” is used here with reference to the roles of signifier
and signified played at different times by the entities Inscription,
Expression and Conceptualization. Thus, when we say that an
Expression accounts for a Conceptualization, we consider that
the Conceptualization is the result of an interpretation by an agent,
with the Expression playing the role of signifier and the
Conceptualization being the signified.
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(“indicator” is the term used in (Bilder et al. 2009)), whereas
others involve a great number of indicators. Some assessment
instruments are limited to recording a subject’s answers to a
questionnaire concerning his/her behavior or psychological
state. Others involve several tests, each of which is character-
ized by several parameters quantifying the subject’s perfor-
mance. The way indicators are coded also varies greatly from
one instrument to another. Some instruments refer to a
predefined scale with discrete qualitative or quantitative
values, whereas others have a continuous value within an
open or closed interval. Moreover, some instruments produce
directly meaningful results, whereas others require further
processing: for instance, the subject’s age, level of skill or
educational level may be required for correct interpretation of
the instrument’s output. In order to address this complexity,
we sought to identify the common features of a broad range of
instruments. We thus designed a core model of instruments
that highlights the common structure of instruments, their
function (i.e. the kind of measured quality and the domain
explored) and how the result of their assessment is recorded,
in order to provide a taxonomy of instruments.
In terms of common features, we are concerned with situa-
tions in which health professionals administer instruments (tests
and questionnaires) to assess a subject’s behavior and cognitive
performance. To model these situations, we consider two main
entities: the actions carried out (so-called “instrument-based
assessments”) and the instruments used. In Section 3.1, we
detail the part of the core ontology that conceptualizes these
two entities. Instruments are structurally and functionally com-
plex entities. They are composed of items (named “instrument
variables”) that measure specific aspects of the subject’s neu-
rologic state, behavior or cognitive performance in the domain
explored by the instrument. The administration of instruments
is thus further decomposed into variable assessments, which
consist in asking questions or requesting tasks to be completed.
These assessments yield in scores, which are derived from the
subject’s responses or behavior. In Section 3.2, we add to our
presentation of the core ontology by conceptualizing “instru-
ment variables” and “variable assessments’.
Instrument-Based Assessment
Instrument-Based Assessment actions consist in acquiring
data from Subjects by administering an instrument.
The conceptualization of these actions has a pivotal role in
our ontology by connecting a large number of entities (see
Fig. 2): a Health Professional (for instance a Neuropsychologist
or a Neurologist) involved as an Agent, the Subject (either a
Healthy Volunteer or a Patient) involved in data acquisition, the
broader context of the data acquisition (i.e. an Examination
within a Study), the instrument used (which prescribes the data
to be acquired and the way they are acquired) and, lastly, the
scores generated by the questions and/or tests administered.
There are generally two main forms of Assessments. The
first are called Test-Based Assessments and solicit an authen-
tic production from the Subject, e.g. a reflex, a performance
(such as drawing or a 500-m walk). The second are called
Questionnaire-Based Assessments and consist of an interview
or an inventory. In all cases, these are complex actions whose
structure is based on that of the instrument administered. At
the finest level of decomposition, one finds items that prompt
the performance of measurements; these actions and their
results are detailed in Section 3.2. In our ontology, we adopt
a common classification of Instrument-based Assessments
that depends on the type of acquired data (e.g. neuropsycho-
logical/cognitive, behavioral or neuroclinical/neurologic da-
ta). However, this classification does not induce formal rules
about who is allowed or not to administering them.7
Instrument-Based Assessments are organized around the
administration of an “Assessment Instrument” (an “Instru-
ment”, for short). These Instruments are intentionally de-
signed to assess the subject’s state under one or more dimen-
sions. According to our theory of artifacts (cf. Section 2.4),
Instruments clearly are Technical Artifacts that may be de-
scribed in three respects. Instruments are:
& Intangible, i.e. propositional contents, including “clearly
defined methods and instructions for administration or
responding, a standard format for data collection, and
well-documented methods for scoring, analysis, and inter-
pretation of results” [CDISC, 2008].8
& Functional, i.e. tools enabling to explore entities related to
the Subject’s state. These categories of entities correspond
to the Instrument's Domain(s).
& Social, i.e. intentionally created, adopted for use, adapted
and maintained by a community that ascribes them with
the status of a standard.
As intangible, propositional content, an Instrument is
expressed in language and is physically inscribed on a medi-
um of some kind. Indeed, Instruments are usually physically
materialized by several documents.9 In order to conceptualize
Instruments, we chose to focus on their conceptual structure
and function.
7 Because these constraints depend on local usages and/or national legis-
lations, the core ontology does not provide with a set of predefined
c on s t r a i n t s . Con s t r a i n t s c a n b e s p e c i f i e d u s i n g t h e
‘isEmpoweredToPerform’ relationship in the module Action-OS.
8 CDISC (Clinical Data Interchange Standards Consortium), CDISC
Clinical Research Glossary Version 7.0, Applied Clinical Trials (2008),
1 2 – 5 8 . ( s e e h t t p : / / w w w . c d i s c . o r g / g l o s s a r y /
CDISC2008GlossaryVersion7.0.pdf).
9 These documents correspond to what are commonly called “test mate-
rials” (American Psychological Association, 2002), i.e. protocols, man-
uals, test items, scoring algorithms and so on. Technically, we identify an
Instrument as propositional content reifying the contents of all the
documents that materialize an instrument.
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Structurally, an Instrument appears as a list of items, each
of which corresponds to a specific aspect of the subject’s state.
Questions or tasks are associated with each item assessing the
subject’s performance levels. We refer to these parts as “In-
strument Variables”, in order to emphasize that they are mea-
surement tools and that they bear values (which vary from one
subject to another). But some Instruments have a more com-
plex structure. Given that (i) brain function is constituted by a
number of smaller elementary processes and (ii) the most
complex10 functions are made up of a large number of ele-
mentary functions distributed across many areas of the brain,
some Instruments are composed of Sub-Instruments. This is
notably the case for the MMS Instrument, which notably
contains MMS Orientation and MMS Language tests. Each
Sub-Instrument explores a more elementary process of overall
cognitive function (e.g. orientation, memory, verbal capaci-
ties, etc.).To model the structure as a whole, we use the
isAPartOfDuring relation (or, more precisely, the
isAProperPartOfDuring sub-relation).
In functional terms, Instruments explore classes of entities
with differing ontological natures. For instance, memory is a
cognitive capacity or function, whereas depression is a disease
state. Given that the effects of brain disorders are rarely
confined to a single behavioral dimension or functional sys-
tem (Lezak et al. 2004) (pp. 86–87), Instrument-Based As-
sessments focus on different issues: neurologic disorders (e.g.
weakness, stiffness and visual impairments), cognitive impair-
ments (e.g. aphasia, failure of judgment and lapse of memory)
and other behavioral disorders (e.g. personality change, re-
duced mental efficiency and depression). To measure these
various features, Instruments are specialized: Questionnaires
mainly explore behaviors and disease states (called “traits”)
while Tests (called “Test Instruments” so as not to confuse
them with the act of testing a subject) mainly explore abilities,
skills, cognitive impairments and unaffected cognitive func-
tions. The structural complexity of an instrument is related to
its functional complexity. An Instrument may be designed to
explore one or more domains (Mono-domain vs. Multi-
domain Instrument). The WAIS-III is a typical example of a
Multi-domain Instrument; it explores a whole set of domains,
like “verbal comprehension”, “workingmemory”, “perceptual
organization” and “processing speed”. This reflects
Wechsler’s definition of intelligence as “the aggregate or
global capacity of the individual to act purposefully, to think
rationally and to deal effectively with his environment”
(Wechsler 1939).
10 Even apparently basic tasks may be “complex”. The current connec-
tionist view is that the brain operates via a number of “distributed
functions and subsystems”.
Fig. 2 Concepts and relations structuring one part of our core ontology of instruments. A solid arrow represents a subsumption link (i.e. an “is a”
relation); a dashed line indicates that sibling concepts are incompatible (i.e. they have disjoint extensions)
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Formally, a Domain is modeled as an individual concept that
classifies classes of entities. The concepts of states, capacities
and disease states (having a role as an Instrument’s Domain) are
reified11 as individuals in the domain of discourse. This means
that a concept such as Verbal comprehension (which in princi-
ple represents a class of dispositions of subjects) is accounted
for in our conceptualization as an individual (an instance of the
class Concept). This enables to assign it with properties and, for
instance, express the fact that the Verbal comprehension do-
main is explored by Instruments in the WAIS-III class.
In this section, we showed how instruments and the ad-
ministration of instruments were conceptualized. The follow-
ing section focuses on the Instrument Variables and the latter’s
two main functions: (i) to describe precisely what is being
explored and measured and (ii) to relate the scores to the
context in which the assessment is made.
Variable Assessment
An Instrument is composed ultimately of Instrument Variables
(“Variables”, for short) that prescribe a specific measure. As
with the conceptualization of Instruments, we consider two
main entities: Variables and the measuring actions associated
with them (called “Variable Assessments”) (Fig. 3).
Variables are Artifacts (Subject Data Acquisition Artifacts,
in fact) with specific functions. As for Instruments at the most
general level, our conceptualization neglects the documenta-
tion associated with Variables (e.g. the questions that have to
be asked and instructions on how to execute tests) and focuses
on functional descriptions. In functional terms, a Variable
explores a Domain that usually corresponds to or refines the
Domain explored by the corresponding instrument. Depend-
ing on whether this Domain coincides with the Instrument’s
Domain or it relates to other similar entities (with the aim of
acquiring additional information), one distinguishes between
a Main Variable and a Secondary Variable, respectively. Fur-
thermore, a Variable aims at measuring a dimension or prop-
erty of these Domain entities, which we conceptualize as a
Quality (for example, the Intensity, the Frequency, the Sever-
ity or the Impact of the patient’s disease state on his/her
relatives). The explored Domain and the measured Quality
constitute the functional information attached to a Variable.
A Variable Assessment action isAProperPartOf an
Instrument-based Assessment action. These actions share sev-
eral properties: they have the same Agent and concern the
same Subject. The Variable Assessment actions link scores (as
results of measurements) to the measured Variables. Depend-
ing on the nature of the explored Domain, Qualities may have
as value i) a Number or a Scalar Quale (a Number plus a Unit
of Measure) – the corresponding Variable is called a “Numer-
ical Variable”, or ii) coded items of a Scale – the correspond-
ing Variable is called “Coded Variable” (see Fig. 3). Numer-
ical Variables essentially measure the level of performance in
the realization of actions. The measured values are thus (for
example) elapsed times, distances covered and numbers of
items recognized. A Numerical Variable is often associated
with intervals of allowed values, which we conceptualize as
minimum and maximum values. For example, the Vocabulary
Variable of the WAIS-III Vocabulary instrument measures the
subject’s verbal knowledge and understanding on a scale of 0
to 66. For Coded Variables, the measured values are items of a
scale (Scale Items) encoded by linguistic expressions (to
facilitate the communication of values between humans)
and/or numbers (to enable calculations). For Coded Variables,
the measured values are items of a scale (Scale Items) encoded
by linguistic expressions (to facilitate the communication of
values between humans) and/or numbers (to enable calcula-
tions). For example, the EDSSv1 Variable of the Expanded
Disability Status Scale (EDSS) neurologic instrument mea-
sures the subject’s neurologic state on a scale that
hasForMinimumScaleItem: “0.0: Normal neurologic exam”
and hasForMaximumScaleItem: “10.0: Death due to MS”. It
is important to note that for a given Quality, a great number of
Subjects share the same value as a measurement result.12 The
Score concept’s role is therefore to specify which value is the
Result of a Variable Assessment by linking a given Variable to
a given Subject. Some scores are sensitive to age, gender or
educational level. Thus, for many Instruments based on pop-
ulation screening, normative data has been published as func-
tion of age, gender and/or educational level. This information
is included in the definition of the Instrument. For example,
WAIS-III included normative data for the IQ Variable sepa-
rated into 13 age-dependent groups. Variables are then cate-
gorized as Gender-Dependent Variables, Age-Dependent Var-
iables and Cultural-Skill-Dependent Variables. Normative da-
ta are often used to quote individual Scores obtained by
Subjects. In such a case, Raw Scores are converted to
Corrected Scores and Standard Scores by using charts and
tables provided with the Instrument.
Domain Ontologies for Three Specific Instruments:
The MMS, EDSS and CDR
The objective of this section is to illustrate the use of the
above-described core ontology to define specific ontologies
11 Reification: The term ‘reification’ commonly means ‘making some-
thing concrete’. In our case, concepts that refer to classes of entities are
made concrete by considering them as individuals modeled by instances.
12 At a same time, billions of people on the planet have the same corporal
temperature. More precisely, according to the theory of Qualities
adopted in DOLCE, it corresponds to the population of the Earth for
billions of Temperature Qualities (one per person), but many of
them share the same value (Quale) at a given time.
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of instruments through concept specialization. In the pre-
vious sections, we described our generic conceptualization
of instruments and highlighted the latter’s common struc-
ture. In the present section, we show how this core ontol-
ogy is used to model the MMS (which grades cognitive
functions with numerical variables), the EDSS and the
CDR (both of which express neurologic and behavioral
assessments as coded variables), We introduce the instru-
ments’ respective general structures and decompose them
into sub-instruments and variables. The specific instru-
ments and instrument variables are defined as subclasses
of the generic classes of Instruments and Instrument vari-
ables. These classes model the common properties of the
corresponding instrument and variable instances used at
different healthcare institutions. Alternatively, we could
have chosen to model these entities as instances and not
as classes. However, our ontology was primarily intended
for use as a common reference ontology, in order to inte-
grate score data from different neuroimaging centers and
obtained from assessment instruments that may slightly
differ from one site to another. Modeling the common
properties of these instruments as classes is appropriate
and provides some flexibility in the definition of local
instrument instances.
The Mini-Mental State as an Example
of a Neuropsychological Instrument
A neuropsychological check-up is based on the observation
and application of objective Tests for grading cognitive func-
tions. A neuropsychological examination is structured by the
list of the cognitive functions to be tested, e.g. executive
function, memory, language, attention, arithmetic, logical rea-
soning, global cognitive efficiency, movements and visuospa-
tial functions – each of which is explored by one or several
Neuropsychological Instruments. Some of the latter may be
composed of several Sub-Instruments, each of which is spe-
cifically designed to explore a particular cognitive function.
The examination performed by a Neuropsychologist as an
Agent generates both qualitative and quantitative Scores. The
MMS is probably the most widely used neuropsychological
instrument in dementia assessment (Lezak et al. 2004) (pp.
706–708) and is used routinely to grade cognitive functions:
“we devised a simplified, scored form of the cognitive mental
status examination, which includes eleven questions, requires
only 5–10 min to administer, and is therefore practical to use
serially and routinely. It is “mini” because it concentrates only
on the cognitive aspects of mental functions, and excludes
questions concerningmood, abnormal mental experiences and
Fig. 3 Concepts and relations supplementing our core ontology of instruments. A solid arrow represents a subsumption link (i.e. an “is a” relation); a
dashed line indicates that sibling concepts are incompatible (i.e. they have disjoint extensions)
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the form of thinking” (Folstein et al. 1975). The MMS mainly
assesses verbal functions, memory abilities and construction.
The MMS score decreases with age and increases in propor-
tion to the subject’s educational level.
Hence, MMS is a Neuropsychological Instrument that
explores the domain of GlobalCognitiveEfficiency (see
Fig. 4). It is composed of five Sub-Instruments and several
Variables (see Table 1) for assessing five domains: orientation,
calculation, language, memory and praxis. The MMS and its
Sub-Instruments are Test Instruments because they solicit an
authentic production from the subject (e.g. drawing, writing
and word retrieval).
All of the MMS’s Variables are Numerical Variables (see
Fig. 4). For example, the variable MMSv1 (range: 0 to 30) is a
Numerical Variable, which measures the quality Cognitive
Mental Status and hasForQuale a number (an integer) between
0 (MMSv1 hasForMinimumNumericalValue 0) and 30
(MMSv1 hasForMaximumNumericalValue 30). MMSv1
isADataOf a Numerical Variable Assessment which
hasForResult a Numerical Score (a subclass of Score). The
MMS provides dimensionless Scores. Lastly, the Numerical
Variable Assessment of the variable MMSv1 hasForResult a
Score that sums the scores of all the Numerical Variable
Assessments of the MMS's Sub-Instruments.
The Expanded Disability Status Scale as an Example
of a Neurological Instrument
The EDSS measures disability, neurologic dysfunction and
disease severity in multiple sclerosis (Kurtzke 1983). It con-
sists of a neurologic evaluation where walking and motor
control ability contribute mainly to the EDSS final score, in
addition to brainstem, sensory, bowel, bladder, and visual
capacity examination (Lezak et al. 2004), (pp. 244–245).
A Neurologist administers EDSS to explore neurologic
functions in multiple sclerosis patients and thus to estimate
the disease severity. This Instrument is representative of the
category of Neurologic Instruments, used to rate the degree of
difficulty encountered by the subject in performing a task that
involves a disease-altered brain function. The EDSS is a Test-
Instrument (rather than a Questionnaire), since it primarily
relies on the subject’s actual performance (e.g. the presence
of reflexes and the subject’s performance in a 500-m walk (see
Fig. 2)).
Fig. 4 The main concepts and relations used to represent the MMS
instrument. The instance MMS-Pitié-Salpêtrière Hospital represents a
specific MMS instrument used at Pitié-Salpêtrière Hospital (Paris,
France). The Figure illustrates the MMSv1 variable used for rating, based
on various Numerical Scores for cognitive mental status at Pitié-
Salpêtrière Hospital. The NVA#57 hasForResult a Numerical Score equal
to 24, in this case. White rectangles represent domain ontology concepts;
gray rectangles represent instances
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Hence, the EDSS is both a Test-Instrument and a
Neuroclinical Instrument that mainly measures disability in
walking and motor control (see Table 2 for a full description).
Figure 5 shows an excerpt of the classes and relations used to
model the EDSS. The Subject Data Acquisition Instrument
EDSS is a subclass of Neurologic Instrument. The domain
explored by EDSS is Neurologic functions. An overall mea-
surement of Disability Status is based on the EDSSv1 Variable
(see Fig. 5), which combines the set of scores provided by the
EDSS Sub-instruments.
EDSSv1 is a subclass of Coded Variable and EDSSv1
hasForScale a Scale that hasForMinimumScaleItem: “0.0:
Normal neurologic exam” and hasForMaximumScaleItem:
“10.0: Death due to MS”. The whole scale is presented in
Table 3. EDDSv1 isADataOf a Coded Variable Assessment
and hasForResult a Coded Score, a subclass of both Score
and Scale item. Most Scale items used in EDSS are Bi-
coded Scale Items, i.e. Scale Items that have both a qual-
itative scale item code and a quantitative scale item code.
The Clinical Dementia Rating as an Example of a Behavioral
Instrument
The Clinical Dementia Rating (CDR) was developed at the
Memory and Aging Project at Washington University School
of Medicine in 1979 for the evaluation of staging severity of
dementia. The CDR is obtained through semi-structured in-
terviews of patients (e.g. the clinician asks the question “Can
you find your way around familiar streets? Usually, Some-
times, Rarely or Don’t Know”) and dementia is rated in 6
domains of functioning: memory, orientation, judgment and
problem solving, community affairs, home and hobbies, and
personal care; each of which is explored by a Sub-instrument
(see Table 4) (Morris 1983). The CDR is modeled as a
subclass of a Behavioral Instrument and a Questionnaire.
The CDR is an illustrative example of an Instrument that
investigates behavior, e.g. depression, anxiety or dependence
(in dementia, for instance). These instruments are adminis-
tered by Psychiatrists, Psychologists and (sometimes)
Table 1 The neuropsychological
instrument Mini-Mental State Ex-
amination (MMS) with its sub-
instruments and instrument
variables
Instrument acronym Variable
acronym
Domain explored by variable Maximum
numerical
value
Instrument name Quality measured by variable
MMS MMSv1 Global cognitive efficiency 30
Mini Mental State Cognitive mental status
MMS-1 MMS-1v1 Orientation 10
MMS Orientation Performance on orientation
MMS-1-1 MMS-1-1v1 Orientation to time 5
MMS Orientation to time Performance on orientation to time
MMS-1-2 MMS-1-2v1 Orientation to place 5
MMS Orientation to place Performance on orientation to place
MMS-2 MMS-2v1 Short term verbal memory 3
MMS Registration Performance on registration of three objects
MMS-3 MMS-3v1 Attention 5
MMS Attention and
Calculation
Performance on counting backwards by 7
MMS-4 MMS-4v1 Long term verbal memory 3
MMS Recall Performance on recall of three objects
MMS-5 MMS-5v1 Language 8
MMS Language tests Language performance
MMS-5-1 MMS-5-1v1 Oral language production 2
MMS Language naming Performance on naming of two objects
MMS-5-2 MMS-5-2v1 Oral language production 1
MMS Language repetition Performance on repetition of a sentence
MMS-5-3 MMS-5-3v1 Oral language comprehension 3
MMS Language 3 stage
command
Performance on execution of a 3 stage command
MMS-5-4 MMS-5-4v1 Written language comprehension 1
MMS Language reading Performance on reading a sentence
MMS-5-5 MMS-5-5v1 Written language production 1
MMS Language writing Performance on writing a sentence
MMS-6 MMS-6v1 Motor component of constructional functions 1
MMS Copy design Copy accuracy
Neuroinform
Neurologists during a Behavioral Interview, which is a
Questionnaire-based Assessment (see Fig. 2). Figure 6 shows
an excerpt of the classes and relations used to model the CDR.
Each domain is rated on a 5-point scale of functioning as
follows: 0, no impairment; 0.5, questionable impairment; 1,
mild impairment; 2, moderate impairment; and 3, severe im-
pairment (personal care is scored on a 4-point scale without a
0.5 rating available). The global CDR score is computed using
the Washington University online algorithm.13 The domain
Dementia is rated with a global measurement (CDR-SoBv1
variable) obtained by summing each of the domain box
scores, with scores ranging from 0 to 18. The Numerical
Variable (CDR-SoBv1) is transformed into a Coded
Variable(CDR-GBBv1) which hasforscale a 5-point scale in
which CDR-0 connotes no cognitive impairment, and then the
remaining four points are for various stages of dementia:
CDR-0.5=very mild dementia (questionable dementia),
CDR-1=mild, CDR-2=moderate, CDR-3=severe (see
Table 5).
The instance CDR-Pitié-Salpêtrière Hospital represents a
specific CDR instrument used at Pitié-Salpêtrière Hospital
(Paris, France). In this case, the NVA#60 hasForResult a
Coded Score equal to “mild dementia”.
Awhite rectangle represents a domain ontology concept; a
gray one represents an instance.
Discussion
We shall first discuss the methodology used to build the
ontology and then position our work within the field of
ontological engineering in general and the engineering of
biomedical ontologies in particular (§5.1). Lastly, we shall
focus on our results, the ontology of instruments used in
neurosciences, its current content, future extensions and con-
nections with services (reasoning) supported by the model
(§5.2).
Engineering Biomedical Ontologies
The “multi-abstraction-layer” and “multicomponent” ap-
proach adopted here is generally advocated for the design of
large, multi-domain ontologies (Borgo and Masolo 2009) in
general and those used in biomedical research in particular
(Smith and Scheuermann 2011).
In theory, this type of approach has several advantages.
Firstly, the use of foundational ontologies impacts the overall
quality and consistency of domain ontologies. Secondly, the
development of core domain ontologies is more likely to
produce inter-domain consistency and avoids the proliferation
of concepts and relations. Indeed, our experience has revealed
the following positive aspects. The joint use of DOLCE, IEC
(Fortier and Kassel 2004) and a generic ontology of artifacts
(Kassel 2010) allowed us to distinguish between three13 http://www.biostat.wustl.edu/~adrc/cdrpgm/index.html
Table 2 The neurologic instru-
ment Expanded Disability Status
Scale (EDSS) with its sub-
instruments and instrument
variables
Instrument model acronym Variable model
acronym
Domain explored by variable
Instrument model name Quality measured by variable
EDSS EDSSv1 Neurologic functions
Expanded Disability Status Scale Disability status
EDSS-1 EDSS-1v1 Visual Function
EDSS Visual optic functions Optic function performance
EDSS-2 EDSS-2v1 Cranial Nerves Function
EDSS Cranial nerve examination Brainstem function performance
EDSS-3 EDSS-3v1 Motor Function
EDSS Pyramidal functions Pyramidal function performance
EDSS-4 EDSS-4v1 Cerebellar Functions
EDSS Cerebellar examination Cerebellar function performance
EDSS-5 EDSS-5v1 Sensory Function
EDSS Sensory examination Sensory function performance
EDSS-6 EDSS-6v1 Bowel and Bladder Function
EDSS Bowel bladder functions Bowel bladder function performance
EDSS-7 EDSS-7v1 Cerebral Functions
EDSS Mental status examination Cerebral function performance
EDSS-8 Ambulation
EDSS Ambulation EDSS-8v1 Ambulation performance without assistance
EDSS-8v2 Ambulation performance with unilateral assistance
EDSS-8v3 Ambulation performance with bilateral assistance
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complementary dimensions for our assessment instruments.
The intrinsic properties of instruments correspond to concep-
tual contents that are physically materialized by documents.
The instruments’ functional properties are qualities of entities
corresponding to the domains that they explore, whereas the
instruments’ social properties are created and maintained by
communities of practice. Moreover, a core ontology of these
instruments leads to homogeneous conceptualization, which
impacts on both the exploitation of the derived domain ontol-
ogies (i.e. uniformity of queries) and the ontologies’
maintenance.
This multilayer approach uses a foundational ontology to
structure the conceptualization. The question of which founda-
tional ontology to choose then arises. In the biomedical do-
main, the Open Biological and Biomedical Ontologies (OBO)
initiative has federated a large group of researchers around the
Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) and the reference ontology of
relations (Smith et al. 2007). Other initiatives are exploring
alternatives to BFO. As we have seen, DOLCE has been used
for the development of OntoNeuroLOG. In fact, the two foun-
dational ontologies are quite similar. Our choice of DOLCE
was dictated by two main factors. On one hand, its cognitive
bias proved to be suitable for the modeling of assessment
instruments having a cognitive (social) nature (in contrast to
BFO’s realistic stance). On the other hand, the availability of a
complete, rigorous axiomatic (i.e. a set of axioms) facilitated
the understanding (and therefore the reuse) of the foundational
ontology (Temal et al. 2008). However, over and above the
choice of one foundational ontology or another, what is really
important is the existence of modules that complement the
foundational ontology and the modules’ overall structure
(Schneider et al. 2011). We used a generic ontology of artifacts
and a general concept of artifact that transcends the domains of
physical entities and mental and social entities. This represents
an important element of our model because it enables the
conceptualization of instruments as subclasses of artifacts. In
the OBI (Brinkman et al. 2010) extension of the BFO, instru-
ments are considered only as material, physical entities (the
term “device” is used synonymous with “instrument”). Ques-
tionnaires are also introduced. However, their artifact status,
intentional origin and function are all ignored. This observation
shows the importance of defining a more generic concept of
“measuring instrument” (artifact, in our case) and anchoring
the latter within a foundational ontology.
Fig. 5 The main concepts and relations used to represent the EDSS
instrument. The instance EDSS-Pitié-Salpêtrière Hospital represents a
specific EDSS instrument used at Pitié-Salpêtrière Hospital (Paris,
France). The Figure illustrates the EDSSv1 for rating based on a Coded
Score for neurological functions. In this case, theNVA#59 hasForResult a
Coded Score equal to “Minimal disability in two functional systems”.
White rectangles represent domain ontology concepts; gray rectangles
represent instances
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Wewere confronted with twomain limitations of DOLCE -
limitations that also affect other foundational ontologies, as far
as we know. The first limitation concerns the conceptualiza-
tion of the values of Qualities (Qualia) and regions of values
(Quality Spaces) as abstract entities with no spatiotemporal
location (Abstracts). In keeping with the notion of a region of
values, we considered measurement scales to be Quality
Spaces. However, as noted in Section 3, measurement scales
are created, adopted and removed. Indeed, they have the same
temporal extension as the assessment instruments to which
they are attached. This clearly contradicts the timeless nature
of Abstract entities. Secondly, different instruments with dif-
ferent measurement scales can measure the same kind of
Quality; hence, our current association between a single Qual-
ity Space and one kind of Quality is not tenable. These two
limitations have been acknowledged by the authors of DOL-
CE and removed from the revised DOLCE-CORE kernel
(Borgo and Masolo 2009). Fundamentally, a new view of
the nature of the Qualities was introduced by making them
depend on standardized measuring instruments (Masolo
2010); what we measure depends not only on the measure-
ment procedure but also (and above all) on the instruments
created for this purpose. In parallel with this revision, two
extensions were recently proposed: an ontology of semantic
data14 (Probst 2008) and a generic ontology of observation
and measurement (Kuhn 2009). These works15 demonstrate
14 In the philosophy of mind, “sensory data” (“qualia”) are distinguished
from “semantic data” to which linguistic terms are related and which are
used to communicate observations and measurement results (for a com-
prehensive overview of this distinction, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Qualia).
15 The OASIS consortium has defined a standard ontology for quantities
and units of measure (http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/tc_home.
php?wg_abbrev=quomos).
Table 3 The detail of the EDSSv1Variable and its linked Scale. The first and second left-most columns respectively contain the values taken by has
quantitative scale item code and has qualitative scale item code properties
Min-value Max-value Number referred
to by quantitative
scale item
Value of
quantitative
scale item code
Value of qualitative scale item code
Yes No 0.0 0.0 Normal neurologic exam (all grade 0 in all Functional System (FS) scores).
No No 1.0 1.0 No disability, minimal signs in one FS (i.e., grade 1).
No No 1.5 1.5 No disability, minimal signs in more than one FS (more than 1 FS grade 1).
No No 2.0 2.0 Minimal disability in one FS.
No No 2.5 2.5 Minimal disability in two FSs.
No No 3.0 3.0 Moderate disability in one FS or mild disability in three or four FS though
fully ambulatory.
No No 3.5 3.5 Fully ambulatory but with moderate disability in one FS and one or two FSs
grade 2.
No No 4.0 4.0 Fully ambulatory without aid, self-sufficient, able to walk without aid or rest
some 500 m.
No No 4.5 4.5 Fully ambulatory without aid; able to walk without aid or rest some 300 m.
No No 5.0 5.0 Ambulatory without aid or rest for about 200 m; disability severe enough to
impair full daily activities.
No No 5.5 5.5 Ambulatory without aid for about 100 m.
No No 6.0 6.0 Intermittent or unilateral constant assistance required to walk about 100 m
with or without resting.
No No 6.5 6.5 Constant bilateral assistance required to walk about 20 m without resting.
No No 7.0 7.0 Unable to walk beyond approximately 5 m even with aid, essentially
restricted to wheelchair.
No No 7.5 7.5 Unable to take more than a few steps; restricted to wheelchair; may need aid
in transfer.
No No 8.0 8.0 Essentially restricted to bed or chair or perambulated in wheelchair; generally
has effective use of arms.
No No 8.5 8.5 Essentially restricted to bed much of day; has some effective use of arm(s);
retains some self-care functions.
No No 9.0 9.0 Helpless bed patient; can communicate and eat.
No No 9.5 9.5 Totally helpless bed patient; unable to communicate effectively or eat/
swallow.
No Yes 10.0 10.0 Death due to MS.
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Fig. 6 The main concepts and relations used to represent the CDR
instrument. The variable CDR-SoBv1 is a subclass of Coded Variable
and measures the quality Severity of dementia by combining scores from
various sub-instruments. CDR-GBv1 hasForScale a Scale that
hasForMinimumScaleItem “CDR-0: no evidence of dementia” and
hasForMaximumScaleItem “CDR-3: severe dementia”. CDR-GBv1
isADataOf a Coded Variable Assessment that hasForResult a Coded
Score - one of the Scale items that isAnAtomicPartOf Scale-CDR-
GBv1 (between CDR-0 and CDR-3). These Scale Items are also Bi-
coded Scale items
Table 4 The instrument Clinical
Dementia Rating Scale (CDR)
with its sub-instruments and in-
strument variables
Instrument model acronym Variable model
acronym
Domain expolred by variable
Instrument model name Quality measured by variable
CDR CDR-SoBv1 Dementia
Severity of dementia (numerical Value [0,18])
CDR scale CDR-GBv1 Dementia
Severity of dementia (five-point scale)
CRD-M CDR-Mv1 Memory
CDR-Memory Severity of memory loss
CDR-O CDR-Ov1 Orientation
CDR-Orientation Severity of orientation difficulty
CDR-J CDR-Jv1 Problem solving judgment
CDR-Judgment and problem solving Severity of impairment in solving problems
CDR-CA CDR-CAv1 Community-activities
CDR-Community affairs Severity of impairment in community activities
CDR-HH CDR-HHv1 Home-activities
CDR-Home activities and hobbies Severity of impairment in home activities
CDR-PC CDR-PCv1 Personal care
CDP-personal care Level of dependency
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the vitality of research in the field of foundational ontologies
and emphasize the need for maintenance of ontologies (such
as the one presented here) so that they can take account of on-
going developments and newly identified needs.
Conceptually, formalization facilitates future ontology ex-
tensions, ontology reuse and inter-ontology interoperability
(such DOLCE and BFO). However, only dissemination into
several domain ontology applications (such as those proposed
in this paper) can provide us with feedback on the strengths
and weaknesses of our approach.
Which Instrument Models Should Be Used
for Which Purposes?
As we saw in Section 4, OntoNeuroLOG covers a wide range
of instruments - from tests to questionnaires. Along with the
ontology’s scope in terms of domains covered, another impor-
tant aspect relates to its functional scope (i.e. the kinds of
reasoning that it enables). The latter is related to the point of
view adopted and the level of detail considered when model-
ing the instruments.
Since our current objective is to share scores within a
federation of research centers, we combined a structural de-
scription of instruments with a representation of the words
used to name the variables and items of scales. Scores are
shared through the definition of standard instruments to which
locally administered instruments conform to a varying degree.
In this respect, it is important to note that today’s ontology
representation languages fail to account correctly for our
knowledge o f i ns t r umen t s . As we have seen ,
OntoNeuroLOG’s classes represent standard instruments with
a standard terminology, whereas a local instrument is concep-
tualized as an instance of one of these classes. This forces the
descriptions of the local instrument and acquired scores to be
logically consistent with the description of a class of standard
instrument. As a consequence, it is not possible to represent
variations of a local instrument with respect to a standard
instrument (e.g. a local questionnaire that has one or more
items that the standard instrument or that measures a variable
with a different scale). Indeed, Hoehndorf et al. have shown
that it is impossible to correctly represent default knowledge
in classes (Hoehndorf et al. 2007). Hence, our descriptions of
local instruments are made logically consistent with the de-
scriptions of standard instruments. We do not formalize vari-
ations and thus leave them in the documentation.
Our ontology reflects the functional dimension of instru-
ments to some extent: instruments “explore” domains and
variables “measure” qualities. OntoNeuroLOG is primarily
based on the clinical expertise acquired at Pitié-Salpêtrière
Hospital. Although domains are modeled here as concepts
(i.e. instances of a Concept class) with which a term is asso-
ciated (e.g. “long term verbal memory” or “problem solving
and judgment”), the classes of entities to which these terms
refer are generally not conceptualized in the literature. Here,
we faced two challenges: firstly, as underlined by (Bilder et al.
2009), the terms used to describe the domain of instruments
and the measured qualities are not sufficiently well defined:
for example, does the term “memory” refer to a capacity, a
function or a process? Does the term “working memory”
mean a kind of “memory”? These terms are vague and there
is no consensus on their definition (Bilder et al. 2009). For
example, what exactly are the differences between “short-term
memory” and “working memory” or between “episodic mem-
ory” and “declarative memory”? Secondly, several concepts
in the field of foundational ontologies are subject to debate; a
consensus on the notions of process (Galton and Mizoguchi
2009), capacity/disposition and function (Borgo and Masolo
2009) has not yet emerged.
Furthermore, there are two main issues related to detailed
modeling of the instruments’ functional dimensions. Firstly,
there is a need to improve the management of functional
dimensions, by (for example) finding instruments that explore
a given function or by comparing instrument definitions that
change over time (White and Hauan 2002). Secondly, speci-
fying the semantics of a given score (such as a measure of a
given quality of a given entity) must yield a more accurate,
detailed model of the subject and his/her state.
Again, these aspects show that our instrument ontology is
not set in stone and will evolve, with (for example) the
development of “cognitive” ontologies (Bilder et al. 2009).
In this respect, one can note the recent work on Cognitive
Paradigm Ontology (CogPO) (Turner and Laird 2012), which
seeks to represent the experimental conditions (i.e. the types of
stimuli, sequences, instructions and expected responses) used
in fMRI and PET experiments. The CogPO is based on the
Cognitive Atlas, a growing knowledge base that lists and
classifies the concepts used in cognitive science (http://www.
cognitiveatlas.org/).
One can also note the recent work on standardization
undertaken by the US National Institute of Neurological Dis-
orders and Stroke; the Common Data Elements (http://www.
commondataelements.ninds.nih.gov/) initiative is aimed at
Table 5 Details of the CDR-GBv1 Variable and its related scale Scale-
CDR-SoBv1
Min-
value
Max-
value
Number
referred to by
quantitative
scale item
Value of
quantitative
scale item
code
Value of qualitative
scale item code
Yes no 0 CDR-0 No evidence of dementia
No no 0.5 CDR-0.5 Questionable dementia
No no 1 CDR-1 Mild dementia
No no 2 CDR-2 Moderate dementia
No yes 3 CDR-3 Severe dementia
Neuroinform
harmonizing information provided in the context of
Parkinson’s disease.
Conclusion
Many neuroscience research centers and networks are now
collecting neurologic, neuropsychological, behavioral and im-
aging data in large databases. In this context, we consider that
our ontology of instruments is relevant for two main reasons.
Firstly, it represents an ontological repository based on in-
depth clinical expertise acquired at Pitié-Salpêtrière Hospital -
an institution known for its outstanding experience in neurol-
ogy and neuropsychology. The exhaustive list of entities
(instruments, variables, explored domains and measured qual-
ities) reflects a broad, well-understood, clinical state of the art.
Moreover, the output of this acquired expertise (in the form of
documents describing instruments and variables) matched the
clinical procedures applied in three other French university
medical centers (in Rennes, Grenoble and Nice) that partici-
pated in the NeuroLOG project. The fact that about 70 % of
the tests incorporated into OntoNeuroLOG were used in all
four institutions justifies our on-going efforts to standardize
neuropsychological and behavioral assessments.
Secondly, our ontology may be extended to the represen-
tation of imaging data and ancillary, behavioral, neuropsycho-
logical and cognitive data. It provides a coherent semantic
space and a knowledge repository for structuring and design-
ing a new generation of databases and associated services in
neurosciences. OntoNeuroLOG may facilitate automatic rea-
soning and knowledge extraction from appropriately designed
and structured databases. An example of a query that can be
expressed using our structured ontological framework is the
selection of instruments that measure variables related to
memory dysfunction, the retrieval of subjects with imaging
markers such as cortical thickness and neuropsychological
markers such as memory impairment or severe dementia,
and the retrieval of the associated scores from a battery of
tests.
Our ontology’s target application is the management of
large data repositories in neurology and psychiatry – fields
of medicine that are being completely transformed by the
recent introduction of multimodal imaging. We consider
that the scheme class/instance proposed here offers ontol-
ogy builders the flexibility needed to seamlessly introduce
notions that are currently difficult to formalize (e.g. cogni-
tive domains, such as verbal comprehension). We hypoth-
esize that the development of the brain function ontology
backed by some researchers (Bilder et al. 2009; Price and
Friston 2005) will help to formalize cognitive notions and
then introduce new classes (rather than instances) into our
ontology.
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